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The MarketValue of ReducingCancerRisk:
HedonicHousingPriceswithChanging
Information
Ted Gayer,*JamesT. Hamilton,tand W. Kip Viscusi:
In thispaper,we use housingpricechangesoccurring
after
thereleaseofa regulatory
agency'senvironmental
riskinformation
to estimate
thevaluepeopleplaceon cancerriskreduction.
Usinga
dataseton therepeatsalesofhouses,matched
withdetaileddataon hazardous
waste
largeoriginal
cancerriskand newspaper
we findthathousingpricesrespondin a rational
to
manner
publicity,
aboutrisk.Sincethenewinformation
indicated
thatthesitesin oursample
changesin information
low cancerrisk,theinformational
releaseled residents
to lowertheirriskbeliefs,
pose relatively
in an averagehousingpriceincrease
of$56 to $87. Thispricechangeimpliesa statistical
resulting
valuepercase ofcancerof $4.3 millionto $8.3 million,
whichis similar
to theestimates
obtained
in labormarket
studiesof thevalueof a statistical
life.Newspaper
aboutthelocal sites
publicity
increased
thatresidents
thenewsas good.
housingprices,suggesting
perceived

1. Introduction
Marketevidence on the value of a statisticallife invariablyconsistsof cross-sectionalevidence on risks and prices or wages at a point in time. If information
about the level of risk
over
time
and
this
information
in
a
rational
manner,therewill be a
people incorporate
changes
corresponding
priceresponse.On thebasis of thesetemporalchanges,one can estimatethemarket
effectsthatcannotbe controlled
price-risktradeoff,
eliminatingmanyconfoundingtime-invariant
forusing cross-sectionaldata. This paper examinesthe marketresponseto the release of governmentinformation
about the level of riskat hazardouswaste sites and providesinsightintothe rationalityof thisresponse.
Studiesbased on experimental
evidenceand surveydata oftenfindthatindividualbeliefsmay
deviatefromobjectiverisklevels.' People oftenoverestimate
highlypublicizedrisksand mortality
risks.In thecase of hazardouswasterisks,bias in riskbeliefsoftenleads to considerablepublicreactionand pressureforsite cleanups,whichmay be an inefficient
outcome.By using marketdata,
* Public
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Box 90245, Duke University,
t SanfordInstitute,
Durham,NC 27708, USA.
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one can examine whetherthis intensepublic reactioncarriesover to contextsin which private
moneyis at stake.
use information
Governmentagenciesfrequently
device,particularly
provisionas a regulatory
since the adventof the right-to-know
movementof the 1980s. Examples of information
provision
effortsinclude the Food and Drug Administration's
thatmanyprescription
requirement
drugs include information
that
inserts,the Departmentof Housing and Urban Development'srequirement
sellersof houses builtbefore1950 informbuyersabout the presenceof lead-basedpaints,and the
thatmanufacturing
ProtectionAgency's (EPA) requirement
Environmental
facilitiesreporttheirannual releasesof chemicalsabove a thresholdamountfora listof over 600 substances.Such regulaabout risk and rationallyadjust their
tions implya beliefthatcitizenscan learnfrominformation
This articleprovidesmarpriorbeliefstowardsthe objectiverisklevel in lightof the information.
transfer
thatsuggestthat
ket evidence to bolsterthe resultsof some surveystudiesof information
individualsrevisetheirriskbeliefsin responseto new information.2
The U.S. federalpolicy dealing withhazardouswaste sites is knownas the Superfundproroster
priority
gram.The mosthazardoussitesare targetedforcleanupand placed on a government
called the NationalPrioritiesList (NPL). Extensionof the classic theoryof compensatingdifferendisamenities(such as hazardouswaste sites)
tials to thehousingmarketimpliesthatenvironmental
will reduce housing prices (Rosen 1974). The negativeimpactof hazardous waste sites on the
housingpricesof nearbyresidencesis well documented.For example,in a previousstudy(Gayer,
Hamilton,and Viscusi 2000), we used an analysisthatfocusedon the sale of 16,928 houses from
1988 to 1993 thatsurroundSuperfundsitesin GreaterGrandRapids,Michigan.We foundthatbeforethe EPA releasedits riskreport,a reductionin thecancer riskfromneighborhoodSuperfund
sites by themean level of riskwould increasetheaveragevalue of a house by $238 (in 1996 dollars).3 To estimatethis willingnessof residentsto pay to avoid cancerrisksbeforethe release of
the EPA's riskreport,we assumed thatresidents'priorbeliefswere equal to the objectivelymeasuredriskssuggestedby the report.Thus, thisanalysiswas based on theverystronginformational
riskassessassumptionthatresidentscould, in effect,predictthe resultsof theEPA's site-specific
a
value
of
a
tradeoff
statistical
cancer
ments.Beforetherelease of thereport,theprice-risk
implied
the impliedvalue of a statistical
case of $51 million.Once the EPA released its riskinformation,
cancercase was $4 million.These resultssuggestthatafterthereleaseof theEPA's riskreport,reforavoidingSuperfundriskswere consistentwithsurveysof the value of a stavealed preferences
tisticallifein thelabor market.
about Superfundrisksby exIn thispaper,we examinehow residentsrespondto information
with
the
of
inforhow
risk
beliefs
release
the EPA's site-specific
may change
plicitlyformulating
mationabout risk levels. We do not assume thatpeople know the site-specificrisksbeforethe
release of the EPA's studiesprovidingestimatesof the cancer risk levels. Rather,we make the
morerealisticassumptionthatpeople base theirestimatesof site riskson theirgeneralknowledge

2 For example,Viscusi and O'Connor (1984) findthatworkersact as Bayesian decision-makers
when theyprocessriskinformation about job hazards. Viscusi and Magat (1987), Viscusi, Magat, and Huber (1987), and Smith et al. (1988) also
presentevidence of risklearning.
3 Otherauthorshave developed estimatesof the impactof all of the disamenitiesgeneratedby a site and expressedthis in
termsof a dollar-distancetradeoff.For example,Kohlhase (1991) foundthatthe marginalprice of an additionalmile from
a Superfundtoxic waste site in Houston was $2364 in 1985. Kiel (1995) foundthatthe marginalprice of an additional
mile fromthe Wells G & H and Industri-Plex
Superfundsites in Woburn,Massachusetts,was $6,468 in 1992. McClelland,
Schulze, and Hurd (1990) foundthatclosing the OperatingIndustriesInc. Superfundsite in Los Angeles, California,increased the average value of a neighborhoodhouse by $5001 in 1985 (all figuresare in 1996 dollars).
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of Superfundsites.The two referencepointswe use involveequatingresidents'priorbeliefsabout
site riskswithestimatesof the averagecancerrisklevel at Superfundsites nationwideand across
aboutthesite-specific
risklevel is released,ourmodel incorthe state.Once theEPA's information
into
estimated
risk
level
residents'
this
posteriorriskbeliefs.
porates
objectively
Because our focusis on changesin riskover time,we focuson thesubsampleof houses sold
morethanonce in the GreaterGrandRapids area from1988 to 1993. This repeatsales methodolbias, because all
ogy allows us to avoid some econometricproblems,such as omitted-variable
time-invariant
effectsdropout of theanalysis.The estimatesconsequentlyisolate whetherpriceeffectsvaryover timeas riskbeliefschange.
The average cancerriskforSuperfundsites throughout
the countryand throughout
the state
is greaterthanthe average riskforthe GreaterGrandRapids sites. Consequently,if residentsare
basing theirpriorson theirgeneralknowledgeof Superfundsites,and if theyupdatetheirbeliefs
EPA riskdata are released,thentheirriskbeliefswill decline aftertheinforafterthe site-specific
mationalrelease.We would thenexpecthousingpricesto increase.If news storiesabout sitesconthatalso causes a reductionin riskbeliefs,thenwe would expecthousingprices
vey information
to rise withnewspapercoverage.We findbothof theseeffectsin the analysisof our repeatsales
sample.When otherfactorsare controlledfor,pricesforhousingsales aftertherelease of theEPA
riskdata are higher.The impliedvalue of a statisticalcase of canceris between$4.3
site-specific
and $8.3 million,dependingon whetherone assumes priorrisk beliefs were based on national
betweenthesevalues and theestiaveragerisklevels or statewideaveragerisklevels. The similarity
matesof thevalue of a statisticallifefromothermarketcontexts,such as thatof thelabor market,
suggeststhatthe residentsreact to risksfromhazardouswaste sites in ways thatclosely parallel
theirreactionto otherrisks.The findingthatnewspapercoverageincreaseshousingvalues further
fromprivatesources about sites can cause people to
suggeststhatthe circulationof information
lowertheirestimatesof risk.
Some otherhedonic studiesexamine whetherthe price-distance(ratherthan the price-risk)
gradientchanges over time,as information
changes.In contrastto our finding,Kiel (1995) found
thatthe price-distance
tradeoffdid not diminisheitherafterthe announcement
of the cleanup or
of
afterthe beginning the cleanup of two Superfundsites in Woburn,Massachusetts.This is not
withour results,since forthesesitesit may be thecase thatthenew infornecessarilyinconsistent
mationconveyedby the cleanup announcement
and action indicatedthatthe risksfromthe sites
were higherthanthe baselineperception.Michaels and Smith(1990) founda price-distance
effect
the
of
after announcement hazardouswaste risksat a site, althoughtheirresultsvaryby housing
submarkets.4
This paperimprovesupon our earlierstudyof hazardouswasterisksin at least threeways: In
the presentstudy,we (i) explicitlymodel how risk beliefsmay change by positingthatpriorbeliefs are based on generalknowledgeof hazardouswaste sites ratherthanassumingthatriskbeliefsdo not change,(ii) use a repeatsales methodologythathelps avoid omitted-variable
biases in
thehedonicanalysis,and (iii) estimatethe value of a statisticalcancercase givenvariousassumptionsof discountratesand latencyperiods.
Discussions of risk policy oftenassume thatindividualscannotaccuratelyperceiverisksor
thattheyfail to updatetheirbeliefsin the face of new information.
This paper providesevidence
thatindividualscan reassess theirbeliefsof the risksat hazardouswaste sites and do spend their
4 For a thoroughreviewof property
hedonic studiesinvolvingenvironmental
disamenities,see Farber(1998) and Boyle and
Kiel (2000).
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own resourcesto avoid theserisks,reflecting
tradeoffs
thatare similarto choices about safetyand
riskin othermarkets.In section2, we describetherepeatsales model specification,
whichwe then
linkto a risk-learning
model in section3. Our data are describedin section4, and resultsand conclusionsare providedin sections5 and 6, respectively.

2. The RepeatSales Estimation
Model
The Hedonic Price Function
we use to assess the effectof changesin risklevels is the hedonic
The empiricalframework
and
model,whichpostulatesthathousingpricesare a functionof structural,
property
neighborhood,
environmental
The environmental
of a house are theperceivedenvicharacteristics.5
characteristics
ronmental
risksassociatedwithlivingin the house. The priceof house i sold at timet is givenby
t),
Pricei,= f(Structurali,
Neighborhoodi,
Environmentit,

(1)

is a vectorcontainingthe structural
whereStructurali
characteristics,
Neighborhoodiis a vectorof
is
the
the neighborhoodcharacteristics,
environmental
risk to the houseperceived
Environmentit
of
t
indicates
the
the
sale.
Notice
that
the
and
environmental
risk
belief
variableis subhold,
year
scriptedwith t, indicatingthat it varies over time. The model assumes thatthe structuraland
are unchangedforeach house across sales.6 Residentshave a learning
neighborhoodcharacteristics
functionin whichtheyupdatetheirpriorbeliefsof hazardouswaste cancerriskafterreceivinginformation
aboutrisklevels fromtheEPA. We describethislearningmodel in section3.
The use of the repeat sales housing methodfirstadvanced by Bailey, Muth, and Nourse
effects.
(1963) eliminatesthe time-invariant
house-specificeffectsand focuseson the time-specific
All thatis requiredforthe analysisis the timeof the housingsale, the price forwhichthe house
risklevel knownat thetimeof each sale. As a result,
was sold, and measuresof theenvironmental
the model focuses on the relationshipbetween changes in risk levels and changes in housing
price.7

Model Specification
The householdsin our sample are exposed to cancer risks arisingfrompotentialsoil and
groundwatercontaminationat nearby Superfundhazardous waste sites. Under the U.S. EPA's
Superfundprogram,hazardouswaste sites thatpose thegreatestrisksto humanhealthor the environmentmay be cleaned up witha combinationof privateand public funds(Sigman 1998). The
is likelyto yield an approximatemeasureof the wel5 The estimatedprice change given a change in a housingcharacteristic
fareeffects(Bartik1988; Palmquist1992).
6 The assumptionof therepeatsales model is thatthe structural
and neighborhoodcharacteristics
are time-invariant.
This is a
forthe housingmarketexamreasonableassumptionforour analysis,since therewere no major changes in infrastructure
ined. We droppedthe observationsfor which therewas a change in the structural
characteristics
(bedrooms,bathrooms,
and lot size) betweensales. If therewere otherchanges to the houses in the sample, thentherewill be omittedvariables.
Even if this were the case, the estimatedcoefficients
of the variablesof interestwould be unbiased if these variableswere
uncorrelatedwiththe omittedvariables.
7 Our analysisis similarto thatof Palmquist(1982), who used a repeatsales methodto estimatethe price effectsof highway
noise.
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EPA has placed these sites in the GreaterGrandRapids area on its NationalPriorityList (NPL),
thusqualifyingthemforfederalremediationfunds.NPL sites undergoa site characterization
process known as the Remedial Investigationand FeasibilityStudy (RI/FS). The RI/FS containsa
assessment
baselineriskassessmentand providesregionalEPA decisionmakerswitha quantitative
of humanhealthriskat a site,a descriptionof remedialactionobjectives,and an analysisof thealternatives
proposedto reachtheseobjectives.Afterevaluatingan RI/FS,theEPA selectsa remedial
actionand thendocumentsthereasonsforits selectionin theRecord of Decision (ROD). The RI/
FS, as well as theROD, are made available to thepublic forexamination.Note thattheEPA's information
aboutrisklevels can influencethosewho have notread theagency'sstudy,since the information
may be disseminatedthroughsuch avenues as residentdiscussions,realtorinteractions,
and media coverage.
Figure 1 presentsa timelineof Superfundeventsin the GreaterGrandRapids area. Each of
the seven Superfundsites was placed on the NPL in the early 1980s. As shown in Figure 1, the
RI/FS foreach site was released at variousdates betweenmid-1990and late 1992. These release
dates occurredwithinthe six-yearperiodof our housingsales.8 Our goal, then,is to use sales data
forthose houses sold more thanonce to estimatethe effectson housingprices of the risk levels
stemmingfromtheRI/FS.
We use two variablesto measurethe information
derivedfromthe EPA. The first,RIit,is a
dummyvariableindicatingwhetherthehouse was sold aftertherelease of theEPA's RI/FS forthe
closestSuperfundsite.The second information
variable,Riskit,is a measureof thecancerrisklevel
derivedfromthe EPA risk information
available to the public. That is, fora house sold afterthe
release of theRI/FS fortheclosest site,Riski,is a measureof theobjectivecancerrisklevel stemmingfromthe site (as derivedfromthe EPA assessmentreleasedto the public). For a house sold
beforethe release of the RI/FS forthe closest site,Riski,is a measureof the averageon-siterisk
level over all nationalor statewideSuperfundsites,weightedby pathwaydilutionestimatescorreto the closest site. Thus, we assume thatriskbeliefsare based
spondingto the house's proximity
on the information
about risklevels available at the timeof the house's sale. The Riski,variable
will serve as the mechanismforexploringthe characterof individuals'risk beliefsand learning,
whichwe will discuss in thenextsection.
It is usefulto comparethisformulation
withthatin our earlierstudy(Gayer,Hamilton,and
in
we
that
Viscusi 2000), which
assumed
respondents'priorriskbeliefscoincidedwithactual risk
levels bothbeforeand afterthe EPA studyrelease. Using thisassumptionin a repeatsales analysis, the changein riskbeliefswould be zero over time.Thus, in thepreviouspaper,theprice-risk
in risklevels, not the temporaldiffergradientwas estimatedfromthe cross-sectionaldifferences
ences. The presentstudypermitsriskbeliefsto varyover timeand in factgeneratesresultsconsisin rationallearningmodels.
tentwiththerebeingan updatingof riskbeliefsas characterized
We use the variableNews, to measurethe site information
providedby local publicity.This
variableis the totalnumberof wordsabout the neighborhoodSuperfundsites printedin the local
newspaperfrom1985 untilthe sale of the house. We also estimatevarious specificationsto test
of theEPA riskinformawhetherthenewspaperpublicityservesas a mechanismof dissemination
tion.We describetheinformation
measuresin greaterdetailin section4.
fixedand time-specific
Equation 1 is a longitudinalmodel of housingpricesthatincorporates
effects.Two problemsarise when one triesto estimatethishedonicprice function.The firstprob-

8 Withinour repeatsales data set,767 housingsales occurredafterthe last RI/FS was issued on November15, 1992.
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Figure 1. Timelineof SuperfundEvents in GreaterGrandRapids, Michigan

lem is that the collection of the relevantstructural,
data is
neighborhood,and environmental
bias. The second problemarises in the
extremelyburdensome,oftenresultingin omitted-variable
choice of functionalform.Hedonic theorydoes notprovideguidanceconcerningwhichparametric
model to estimate.If the parametricmodel is misspecified,the corresponding
benefitsestimator
Most hedonic studiesassume a semilog specificationor a Box-Cox transforwill be inconsistent.
mation(Harrisonand Stock 1984; Bartikand Smith 1987; Cropper,Deck, and McConnell 1988;
Michaels and Smith1990; Kiel and McClain 1995; Gayer,Hamilton,and Viscusi 2000).9
with
By focusingon repeatsales of houses, we eliminatethe problemof omitted-variables
characteristics
of the house. We assume thatchangesin the housingprice
respectto time-invariant
are in percentageterms.Because risk beliefs are based on the risk information,
we can rewrite
I
as
follows:
Equation
Pricei, =

ea2Riskt e3News, e,

Btg(Structurali)h(Neighborhoodi)eI'RI,,

(2)

whereB, is a truebut unknownreal estateprice index at the timeof the sale; otl, 0t2,and ot3 are
the parametersthatgive the relativechanges in price given changes in the variablesof interest;
and Eitis theerrorterm.10
We assume that
= 0 and Var(Eit)= 02.
E(,it)
For the same house sold at time t', the
price functionis the same as Equation 2, except that
it is subscriptedwitht' insteadof t. When theratioof thetwo pricesis taken,the functionsg and
h cancel out,yielding

B

=e
Priceit
Btr

eaO(RIi,, e2(Riski,,
-Riskil)
eO3(Newsl
-Newst)
e(c
Ei -Eit)
-Rlit)

(3)

Takingthenaturallogarithmof each side of Equation (3) yields
P
InPriceit,= b,,- bt+
- RIit,)+ 02(Riskit,- Riskit)+ 03(Newst,- Newst)+ uitt, (4)
atl(RI/,,
Priceit
whereb,, =
and uitt,= Eit, - Eit. Thus, the log of the priceratioover timeis a
bt =
InBrt,
InBt,
in
linear
which
the explanatoryvariablesare the changes in RI/FS status,risk
simple
regression
9 In orderto avoid the complicationsassociated withchoosing an inappropriate
functionalform,Stock (1989, 1991) proposes a nonparametric
kernelregressionforestimatingthe mean price effectof an environmental
price change.
1o The real estate price index is conflatedwith depreciation.Palmquist (1979) suggests a technique for distinguishing
betweenprice trendsand depreciation.However,the estimationadjustmentaffectsonly the price index estimates,not the
coefficients
of the variablesof interest.
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level, and newspaperpublicity.When thereare only two sales of a house, one ratiois formedand
E(uitt,)= 0, Var(uitt,)= 02. When a house is sold threetimes,two ratiosare formed.While the
have a probmeans of the errortermsare stillzero, theircovarianceis equal to 02. We therefore
of
observations."
lem errorcorrelation
among
of interestin Equation4 correspondto the effectsof RI/FS status,risklevel,
The coefficients
and newspaperpublicityon housingpricesin theoriginalhedonicequation(Eqn. 2). In additionto
thetime-invariant
therepeatsales methodallows fortheestimationof real estate
effects,
eliminating
do not occurin subsequentyearsand theyearsof the
pricetrendseven thoughthe sales frequently
sales mayvaryby house. Bailey,Muth,and Nourse(1963) show thatestimationof thepriceindexes
can be treatedas a regressionproblemby lettingxj be a dummyvariablethattakesthevalue of + 1
if periodj is theperiodof thefinalsale, -1I if periodj is theperiodof theinitialsale, and 0 otherwise foreach pairof transactions.
The indexis normalizedby lettingbo = 0. Equation(4) becomes
=
ritt,

T
j=1

bjxj + altRItt,+

+
+ uitt,
o3Newstt,
(2Riskitt,

(5)

whereritt'= ln(Priceit,/Priceit),
RIitt,= RIit,- RIit,Riskitt,= Riskit,- Riskit,Newstt,= Newst,and theothervariablesare as describedbefore.12
Newst,
We estimatebothan ordinaryleast-squares(OLS) regressionof Equation5 and a generalized
least-squares(GLS) regressionthataddresstheproblemof errorcorrelationacross repeatsales observations.13
However,in section5 we reportonly the OLS results,since the pointestimatesand
thestandarderrorsare virtuallyidenticalto theGLS results.

3. PriorBeliefsand RiskLearning
To captureresidents'perceptionsof Superfundrisks,we assume a learningmodel in which
averageof the risklevels obtainedfromthe informaposteriorriskbeliefsare a linearly-weighted
will depend
tional sources.14 The amountof learningthattakes place given the new information
on the magnitudeof the priorand updatedrisklevels, as well as the informational
weightplaced
on bothof thesesourcesof information.
An individual'spriorrisk beliefs (beforethe release of the RI/FS for the closest site) are
The information
content
denoted by p, which has associated informational
weight,(po, is
0po.
equivalentto observingPDodrawsfroma Bernoulliurn.People updatetheirriskbeliefstakinginto
information
about risk levels
accountthe probabilityq, which is impliedby the new site-specific
" We also relax the assumptionof constantvarianceacross repeatsales by computingstandarderrorsunderthe assumption
of heteroskedasticity.
12The dummyvariablescontrolforthe annual price trends.The timecomponentsof RI, Risk, and News vary by day, not
by year. The News, variablevaries only by time,since it measuresthe amountof publicityon Superfundsites up to the
day of the sale. Two houses sold on theexact same day will have the same value forNews, (althoughthechange in publiunless the two houses were sold twice on the same day).
cityin therepeatsales observationwill be different
13 The GLS estimation
matrixis equal to Q2K2,
whereQ is a known,symestimators.The variance-covariance
yieldsefficient
metric,positivedefinitematrixwithtwos on the diagonal and ones wherethe errortermsare correlated.The GLS method
is to finda matrixP such thatP'P = K2-1. The matrixP is multipliedon both sides of the equation,and least-squares
thenyieldsefficient
estimates.
14 This approachis used in Viscusi's (1989) prospectivereferencetheorymodel to structure
biases in risk beliefs.This formulationis consistentwitha rationalBayesian learningmodel,althoughotherlearningmodels may also be consistentwith
such a linearformulation.
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obtained fromthe EPA's RI/FS. Other information
(such as information
providedby the local
The
risk
level
this
of information
the
model
enter
would
updating
similarly.
implied
by
newspaper)
contentCo.Posteriorcancerriskbeliefs,nt,are of theform
has informational
(p, q)=

Po +
?o 0q.

(6)

contentassociated witheach information
source
With the fractionof the total informational
as
denotedby 9 = Po/(Po + ?o), ? = 4o/(Po + ?o), theriskbelieffunctionis rewritten
+
n(p, q) = pp?q

= pp+ (1 - 9)q.

(7)

about risklevels betweenthe two sales of a
Therefore,given the release of the EPA's information
house, a residentchangesbeliefsby posteriorminusprior,whichis equal to
n - p = (9 - 1)p + (1 - 9)q.

(8)

If residentsplace full weighton the updatinginformation
(i.e., 9 = 0), thenthe change in
beliefsis equal to the change in risklevels (q - p). For the otherextreme,residentswould place
no weighton the updatinginformation
(i.e., 9 = 1), in which case the change in beliefswould
information
zero
the
new
(since
equal
providedby theEPA is ignored).
The repeatsales regressionequation discussed in the previoussectionteststhe effectof the
sourchange in risk levels on housingprices withoutspecifyingthe weightson the informational
ces. Housing value changesin responseto thesechangeswould provideevidencethatresidentsdo
information
aboutrisklevels providedby theEPA. In other
place some weighton the site-specific
words, if residentswere ignoringthe site-specificinformation
providedby the EPA, then the
changein risklevels would not affectbeliefs,and thustherewould be no effecton housingprices.
coefficient
fromzero.
The corresponding
estimatewould notbe statistically
different
on
We cannotexplicitlyestimatethe informational
priorand updatedrisklevweightsplaced
els. However,in orderto computethetradeoff
betweenpricesand riskbeliefs,we assume thatfull
and thusthe changein risklevels is equal to
information,
weightis placed on thenew site-specific
the changein riskbeliefs(i.e., nc- p = q - p).
In orderto testthe effectof changes in risklevels, we firstmustpostulatehow rationalindividuals formtheirpriors.In our earlierstudy(Gayer,Hamilton,and Viscusi 2000), we assumed
thatpriorswere equal to the objectiveriskmeasurederivedfromthe EPA's riskreport,even if the
beforethe report.We based this assumptionon the strongcorrelationbepriorswere formulated
tween the objectiverisk measureand the knowncharacteristics
of the sites (such as the size and
of
In
this
we
our
of
the
base
environment
site).
study,
assumption priorson the informational
type
at the timeof the house sale. Beforethe release of the RI/FS forthe closest site,we assume that
That is, we assume
residentsbase theirpriorson the available generalSuperfundriskinformation.
unbiased
are
to
the
on-site
risk
of
on
EPA's
that
sites
NPL, weightedby
priors(p)
equal
average
the house-specificdilutionestimates.5 Therefore,
our assumptionis thattheresidents'priorbeliefs
withregardto theon-siterisksare equal to the averagerisklevels forall nationwide(or statewide)
on the specificrisklevels
Superfundsites,since theseresidentshave not yet receivedinformation
of theirlocal sites.16
When the house-specificdilutionestimatesare used, it is assumed thatbeforethe release of RI/FS, people are aware of
theirproximityto the site (since the site is on the NPL) but are not aware of the on-siterisk(since the EPA has yet to do
a riskassessment).
16 Althoughwe do
not reportit in our results,we also estimaterepeatsales equationsusing priorsin whichthe average onsite risksare weighteduniformly
(using average dilutionestimates)across thepopulationof the houses.
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If the average national(or state) Superfundsite is less riskythanthe GreaterGrand Rapids
sites,thenthe residents'priorswill be below the actual risk (i.e., p < q). If the average national
(or state) Superfundsite is riskierthanthe GreaterGrand Rapids sites,thenthe residents'priors
will be too high(p > q). In each case, accordingto therationallearningmodels,once information
on the actual risk is released,people should revise theirrisk beliefs towardthe truerisk level
is not ignored,i.e., that4 ? 0). However,the degree to which
(given thatthe new information
residentsupdatetheirbeliefsdependson the informational
weighttheyplace on the priorand the
we can
updatedassessments.By assumingthatresidentsplace fullweighton thenew information,
computethemarginalwillingnessto pay forreductionsin riskbeliefs.
We use a standardizedmeasureof cancerriskforboththe priorrisklevel based on a sample
of 150 nationwideSuperfundsites and thatbased on a sampleof 19 statewideSuperfundsites,as
well as the updatedrisklevel forthe local sites.17These risklevels represent
the additionalprobabilityof gettingcancer(relativeto a baselinecancerrisk)fora personlivingon the Superfundsite.
We convertthese on-siteestimatesto house-specificestimatesby using dilutionfactorsthatvary
with the location of the house. We then sum over media (groundwater
and soil) and exposure
routes(dermal,ingestion,and inhalation).In thisway we obtainestimatesof house-specific
prior
and updatedrisklevels. We discuss thecomputation
of theserisklevels morefullyin thenextsection.
The average on-sitelifetimecancer risk to adults fromgroundwater
exposure for the 150
nationalsites is 0.042. The averageon-sitecancerriskto adultsfrom150 sites is 0.005 fromdermal soil exposure,0.002 fromingestionof soil contaminants
and 6.2 x 10-5 frominhalationof
of
in
soil contaminants.
the
19
sites
Using
subsample
Michigan,we findthatthe average on-site
lifetimecancerriskto adultsfromgroundwater
exposureis 0.041. The average on-sitecancerrisk
to adultsfromthe 19 sites is 9.5 X 10-4 fromdermalsoil exposure, 1.2 X 10-4 fromingestion
of soil contaminants
and 1.8 x 10-4 frominhalationof soil contaminants.
theaverage
By contrast,
in
on-sitecancer risk to adultsfromgroundwater
for
the
sites
Greater
Grand
exposure
Rapids is
and
the
on-site
cancer
risk
to
from
is
for
adults
soil
9.6
dermal
0.014,
average
exposure
x 10-5
exposure,6.0 x 10-5 foringestionexposure,and 4.7 x 10-5 forinhalationexposure.Since the
averagenational(and state)risklevel is much higherthanthe averagerisklevel fromthe Greater
GrandRapids sites,we expectthatonce the EPA releases the site-specific
riskinformation,
houswill
since
will
lower
risk
beliefs.
residents
their
increase,
ing prices
Using the repeatsales method,we test whetherhousingprices react to the changes in risk
levels. A negativecoefficient
estimatefora1 fromEquation 5 would suggestthathousingprices
decline as a resultof the release of an RI/FS forthe closest site. On the otherhand, if residents
view the RI/FS as a sign thatthe site will soon be cleaned up, thenone would expect a positive
estimateforal. One would expecta negativecoefficient
coefficient
estimatefor72, suggestingthat
this coefficient
estimate,one
housingprices decline with increasesin risk levels. In interpreting
shouldkeep in mindthatthechangesin risklevels could be confoundedwithchangesin residents'
perceptionsaboutthe likelihoodthatthe site will be cleaned up soon, althoughthe inclusionof the
RI/FS dummyvariablepartiallycontrolsforthis possibility.Given that,on average,the updated
risklevel is smallerthanthe priorsbased on the national(or state)average,a negativecoefficient
17 The 150 sites
were selectedfromthe completepopulationof 267 nonfederalSuperfundsites forwhichRODs were signed

in 1991 or 1992. A subsetof sites was chosen because of the cost of assemblingthe data and because of incompleterisk
assessmentsat some sites. See appendixB of Hamiltonand Viscusi (1999) foran analysisthatsuggeststhatthis subsample is representative.
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estimatefor (2 would suggestthathousingpricesincreasedon averageforthishousingmarketbeabout risklevels. The coefficient
estimatefor03 could be posicause of the release of information
tive or negative,dependingon whetherthe residentsperceivethe local newspaperreportsas good
or bad news.

4. Data Description
For our analysis,we constructeda sample of housingprices for 16,928 houses sold in the
GreaterGrandRapids area betweenJanuary1, 1988, and December31, 1993. Of the 16,928 house
sales, 3702 were forhouses thatsold more thanonce. There were 1755 houses thatwere sold in
two different
years.The resultingrepeatsales
yearsand 64 houses thatwere sold in threedifferent
to repeatsales, a
data set consistsof 1883 observations.18
Thus, even whenthe sampleis restricted
large sample of observationsis obtained.
The GreaterGrand Rapids area consistsof the cities of Grand Rapids, Walker,Wyoming,
Kentwood,and Grandville.This local marketcontainsseven Superfundsites,and therewere quantitativeEPA risk data for all but one of these sites.19A local housing marketwith numerous
of riskamongthehouseholds.
Superfundsitesenhancesthe analysisbecause thereis heterogeneity
We obtaineddata on the dates of the house sales, the house characteristics,
the sale prices,
and the addressesfromthe MultipleListingService of the GrandRapids Societyof Realtors.We
also used a geographicinformation
system(GIS) to computethelongitudeand latitudecoordinates
of each house and of the neighborhoodSuperfundsites.Withthe GIS, we computedthe distance
of each house to each of theneighborhoodSuperfundsites.These distancevalues wereused in the
computationof the risklevels describedbelow, since we weightedthe on-siteriskassessmentsfor
soil exposureby EPA standardson dilutionestimatesthatvaryby distanceto the site. Application
of thisdistancedilutionestimateto the on-siteriskassessmentsyieldshouse-specific
risklevels of
soil exposure.
We use two variablesto measurethe risk information
thathouseholdsderivefromthe EPA.
The firstis a dummyvariable,RIit, whichhas a value of 1 if the day of the house's sale was after
the release of the EPA's RI/FS forthe closest Superfundsite and has a value of 0 otherwise.The
otherrisk information
availvariable,Riskit, measuresthe risklevels on the basis of information
able to the residents.If a house was sold beforethe release of the RI/FS forthe closest site,then
Riski,is equal to the national(or state)on-siteaveragerisklevel of Superfundsites,weightedby
the house's dilutionestimates.If the house was sold afterthe release of the RI/FS of the closest
site,thenRiski,is equal to the on-siterisk level derivedfromthe EPA's site-specific
assessment,
also weightedby thehouse's dilutionestimates.
The EPA computesthe on-siterisklevel fora chemicalas theproductof chemicalconcentrathe inverseof body weight,the inverse
tion,ingestionrate,exposureduration,exposurefrequency,
of the averagingtime,and the chemical'sslope factor.The slope factoris an upper-boundestimate
of theprobability
of the developmentof cancerper unitintakeof thechemicalover a lifetime.We
risklevel by
weightboththe on-sitenational(or state)averagerisklevel and thelocal site-specific
soil and groundwater
dilutionestimatesin orderto estimatethe impactof the knownrisklevel on
1

Houses sold twice count as one observation,and houses sold threetimescount as two observations.Thus, the totalnumber of observationsforthe repeatsales model is 1755 + (64 x 2) = 1883.
'9 The NPL sites used in this studyare all of those for which RI/FSs were released duringthe relevantsample period. For
the Spartansite therewas only a qualitativeanalysis,whichdoes not includeresidentialriskestimates.

276

Gayer,Hamilton,and Viscusi

residentsat different
locations.20We drawon EPA guidelinesforthe soil dilutionestimates,which
are a functionof the distancesto the sites (which were measuredusing the GIS). To estimate
reserdilution,we use the GIS to map the groundwater
groundwater
plumes (naturalunderground
voirs) and to computethe proportionof houses in the Census block group residingabove these
plumes.For each block group,we use data fromthe U.S. Bureau of Census to determinetheprothuspotentiallyexposingthemto
portionof householdsthatdraw theirwaterfromgroundwater,
the cancerrisk.These modifications
mean thatour risklevel variablewill not correspondexactly
to a particularfigurein theEPA reports,even thoughthislevel is based on theunderlying
EPA reportdata. Since therisklevel dependson thelocationof thehouse and the timingof thesale with
Riski,variesover timeand witheach house.
respectto thereleaseof theinformation,
We computeour publicitymeasure,Newst, on the basis of press coverage in the Grand
Rapids Press, whichservestheentireGreaterGrandRapids area. We computetheNews, variable
the exact publicationdate of each Superfund-related
articleand thencomputby firstdetermining
the
number
of
in
The
words
each
article.
variable
measures
the
numberof wordsin the
exact
ing
of
in
until
the
the
sale.21
the
between
sales is gauged
articlesup
Therefore, change publicity
day
as the numberof wordsprintedin articlesbetweenthe day of the initialsale and the day of the
nextsale. This changein publicityhas a unique value foreach repeatsales observationunless two
houses were twicesold on the same day.22
Table 1 containssome descriptivestatisticsforthe data set. The mean price of a house was
$70,500. On average,a house's price increasedby about $7200 betweensales. The
approximately
mean numberof wordsprintedin the Grand Rapids Press abouttheSuperfundsitesat thetimeof
the sale was approximately13,000 (about 23 articles).Given priorsbased on the nationalon-site
average weightedby the house's dilutionestimates,the mean cancerrisk level at the timeof the
initialsale was 1.23 x 10-5, and themean changebetweenupdatedrisklevels and priorrisklevels
was -7.80 X 10-6. Given priorsbased on the stateon-siteaverageweightedby the house's dilutionestimates,the mean cancerrisklevel at the timeof the initialsale was 4.93 x 10-6, and the
mean changebetweenupdatedrisklevels and priorrisklevels was -2.60 x 10-6.
To examinethenatureof thepriceand riskchangesunderlying
theregressionanalysis,Table
2 presentsinformation
on those houses in the data set thatwere sold in 1989 and thenagain in
1992 (the modal repeat sales pair). The top rows indicatethe changes in price, risk level, and
characteristics
news; the remainingrows indicatethe houses' structural
(which do not change beto keep in mindthatthroughout
thispaper,changesin risklevel refer
tweensales). It is important
to changes in risk knownto the residents,not actual changes in risk exposure.Thus, when the
the residentsbecome aware of a different
level of risk,even
EPA releases its risk information,
in
of
risk
itself
has
As
can
be
seen
the
first
Table
the
not
column
2, thesehouses
though
changed.
increasedin price by $6252 betweensales and also experienceda drop in risklevels and an increase in news publicity.The second columnof Table 2 shows data on the subsetof houses that
20 This methodologyis similarto thatused in Hamiltonand Viscusi

(1999) and Gayer,Hamilton,and Viscusi (2000).

21 The articlesin
our newspaperdata set begin in 1985. Since the repeatsales analysis uses changes in publicityfromthe

firstsale to the next sale, the startingdate forthe newspapercoverage is irrelevantas long as it begins by the date of the
firsthouse sale in the data set.
22 To the extentthatthe local media disseminatesthe riskinformation
providedby the EPA, the publicitymeasurecould be
correlatedwiththe risklevel. Almostall of the newspaperarticlesdiscuss, at least in part,boththe risksand the costs associated withthe site. However, most of the articles(approximately69%) emphasize the risk forthe sites insteadof the
In our analysis,we ran separatespecificationsin orderto testwhetherthe coefficient
cost information.
estimateschanged
whenthepublicitymeasurewas omitted.
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fortheSampleofRepeatSale Houses
Statistics
Table 1. Descriptive
Variable

Price at timeof initialsale ($)
Change in pricebetweenrepeatsales ($)
Cancerrisklevel at timeof initialsale X 1 million
(prior= nationalaverage)
Change in cancerrisklevel betweenrepeatsales X 1 million
(prior= nationalaverage)
Cancerrisklevel at timeof initialsale X 1 million
(prior= stateaverage)
Change in cancerrisklevel betweenrepeatsales X 1 million
(prior= stateaverage)
Dummyvariableindicatingif house was sold aftertheEPA's
fortheclosestsite (0/1)
RemedialInvestigation
statusbetweenrepeatsales (0/1)
Change in RemedialInvestigation
No. of wordsprintedin newspaperat timeof theinitialsale
No. of wordsprintedin newspaperbetweenrepeatedsales

Mean

Deviation
Standard

70,520
7172
12.30

22,938
6774
38.60

-7.80

28.52

4.93
-2.60

22.30
13.92

0.31

0.46

0.63
12,939
12,667

0.48
8301
5859

had a RI/FS releasedbetweenthe two sale dates,while the thirdcolumnshows data on the subset
of houses thatdid nothave a RI/FS releasedbetweenthetwo sale dates.Those houses thatdid exand a greater
periencea RI/FS had a greaterreductionin risklevels based on the new information
increasein news publicity.To the extentthatthe RI/FS presentsgood news, thatriskis perceived
as an economic bad, and thatthe news publicityis favorable,one would expect the houses for
which an RI/FS was released to have experienceda greaterprice increase than the houses for
whichno RI/FS was released.Of course,unlikethe regressionanalysisconductedin the nextseceffects.Comparingthe
tion,thisanalysisdoes not attemptto separateout the variousinformation
structural
characteristics
of the houses forwhichan RI/FS was releasedto thoseof the houses for
which no RI/FS was released indicatesthatthereis no statistically
difference
between
significant
with
themexcept
regardto thenumberof fireplaces.

5. EmpiricalResults
Estimationof the OLS Equations
As mentionedearlier,the repeatsales model eliminatesthe time-invariant
effects.In orderto
fortime-invariant
testwhethercontrolling
characteristics
affectstheresults,we firstestimatecrosssectionalequations for the 3702 house sales thatwe later use in the repeat sales analysis. The
dependentvariablein this cross-sectionalanalysisis the log of price. Tables 3 and 4 presentthe
cross-sectionalresultswhen riskbeliefspriorto the RI/FS are based on the nationalaverage and
whenriskbeliefspriorto theRI/FS are based on the stateaverage,respectively.
Data are presented
fordifferent
thatvarywithregardto theirinclusionof housingcharacteristics,
specifications
neighborhood characteristics,
countyfixed-effects
dummyvariables,and annual fixed-effects
dummy
variables.
The cross-sectional
resultsindicatethathousingpricesdo respondto thelevel of risk.The coefficient
estimatesfortherisklevel variableare negativeand significant
at the 1% level for4 of the
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Table 2. DescriptiveStatisticsforHouses Sold in 1989 and Sold Again in 1992
Mean Change forAll Houses
Sold in Both 1989 and 1992
(N = 196)

Change in price($)
Change in cancerrisk
level X 1 million
(prior= national
average)
Change in cancerrisk
level X 1 million
(prior= state
average)
Change in news
(no. of words)
Housingcharacteristics
No. of bedrooms
No. of bathrooms
No. of fireplaces
Basement
Lot size (square feet)
Garage

Mean Changes forHouses
Mean Changes forHouses
forwhichRI/FS Was Not
forwhichRI/FS Was Released Released betweenSales
betweenSales (N = 151)
(N = 45)

6252
(5950)
-9.52
(29.15)

6559
(4828)
-12.36
(32.71)

-2.87
(11.61)

-3.73
(13.12)

5232
(8721)

14,093
(2836)

14,505
(2873)

12,712
(2231)

2.93
(0.73)
1.5
(0.56)
0.38
(0.66)
0.84
(0.37)
9176
(6481)
0.91
(0.28)

2.95
(0.74)
1.53
(0.57)
0.44
(0.70)
0.82
(0.38)
9471
(6892)
0.93
(0.26)

2.89
(0.71)
1.40
(0.52)
0.18
(0.49)
0.89
(0.32)
8186
(4792)
0.87
(0.34)

Standarddeviationsare in parentheses.The data are forthe modal years of repeatsales. The differencein means of
the last two columns (which representsa difference-in-difference
approach) is significantat the 1% level forthe change in
in riskforhouses thatdid not have an RI/FS released is zero) and forthe
riskusing the stateaverage (wherethe difference
at the 10% level forthe change in riskusing the nationalaverage (wherethe difference
change in news, and it is significant
in risk for houses thatdid not have an RI/FS released is zero). Comparisonof the housingcharacteristics
for the last two
columnssuggeststhatthe thirdcolumn is an adequate controlgroup,since the means are not significantly
different
between
thetwo columnsexceptforthe numberof fireplaces.

at the 5% level for 7 specifications.23
For the
12 specificationsand are negativeand significant
mean housingprice,the change in price given a mean change in the risk level rangesbetween
$109 and $334 forthe estimatesin Table 3 and between$46 and $126 forthe estimatesin Table
4. The coefficient
estimatesfornewspaperpublicityand forthe release of an RI/FS suggestthat
theseformsof information
do not significantly
affectprices.We now turnto therepeatsales model in orderto controlforthetime-invariant
characteristics.
Table 5 containsthe repeatsales resultsforthe OLS equations.24The firstcolumncontains
resultsbased on the assumptionthatriskbeliefspriorto the release of the RI/FS are based on the
average nationalrisk level of Superfundsites. The second column containsresultsbased on the
assumptionthatriskbeliefsbeforethereleaseof theRI/FS are based on theaveragestaterisklevel

23 All

testsof significancereportedin thispaper are two-sidedtests.
24 As mentionedearlier,we do not reportthe GLS results,since theyare virtuallyidenticalto the OLS results.

Table 3. Cross-SectionalRegressionResultsforSix Specifications(I-VI) (Prior= NationalAverageSuperfundR
I

Cancerrisklevel
Newspaper
information
Remedial
investigation
Housingcharacteristics
Neighborhoodcharacteristics
Countyfixed
effects
Annualfixed
effects
R2

II

III

IV

-473.183***
(110.514)
-2.37 x 10-6***
(7.90 X 10-7)
0.009
(0.013)
Yes

-465.826***
(110.447)
-1.30 x 10-6
(2.39 X 10-6)
0.028**
(0.014)
Yes

-607.810***
(106.637)
8.10 x 10-7
(2.28 X 10-6)
-0.005
(0.014)
Yes

- 197.522**
(97.035)
1.87 x 10-6
(1.95 X 10-6)
-0.012
(0.012)
Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.492

0.494

0.543

0.668

Correctedstandarderrorsare in parentheses.The numberof observationsforeach specificationis 3702, which represents1755 houses s
are the numberof bedrooms,the numberof bathrooms,the numberof fireplaces,whetherthe house has a basement,th
housingcharacteristics
are the proportionof the block groupthatare Black, the medianhouseholdincome in the block group,the pro
The neighborhoodcharacteristics
educated,the citytax rate,the distanceto the centralbusinessdistrict,the seventhgrade readingtestscores in the school district,the proportio
citycrimerate.
** Significant
at the 5% level.
*** Significant
at the 1% level.

Table 4. Cross-SectionalRegressionResuls forSix Specifications(I-VI) (Prior= StateAverage SuperfundRisks
Cancerrisklevel
Newspaper
information
Remedial
investigation
Housing
characteristics
Neighborhood characteristics
Countyfixed
effects
Annualfixed
effects
R2

I

II

I

IV

-437.889**
183.307)
-2.32 X 10-6***
(7.90 X 10-7)
0.011
(0.013)
Yes

-423.983**
(183.211)
-1.17 X 10-6
(2.40 X 10-6)
0.031**
(0.014)
Yes

-685.408***
(177.850)
9.90 X 10-7
(2.29 X 10-6)
-0.001
(0.014)
Yes

-252.211
(163.580)
1.93 X 10-6
(1.95 X 10-6)
-0.012
(0.012)
Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.490

0.492

0.541

0.668

Correctedstandarderrorsare in parentheses.The numberof observationsforeach specificationis 3702, which represents1755 houses s
are the numberof bedrooms,the numberof bathrooms,the numberof fireplaces,whetherthe house has a basement,th
housingcharacteristics
are the proportionof the block group thatare Black, the median householdincome in the block group,the pro
The neighborhoodcharacteristics
educated,the citytax rate,the distanceto the centralbusinessdistrict,the seventhgrade readingtestscores in the school district,the proportio
citycrimerate.
** Significant
at the 5% level.
at the 1% level.
*** Significant
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Table 5. Repeat Sales RegressionResults
Variable

Intercept

Prior= NationalAverage
SuperfundRisk

0.059***

Prior= State Average
SuperfundRisk

0.059***

(0.006)

(0.006)

Year 1990

(0.006)
0.088***

(0.006)
0.087***

Year 1991

0.090***

Year 1989

0.055***

0.055***

(0.009)

(0.009)

Year 1992

(0.014)
0.077***

(0.005)
0.077***

Year 1993

0.077***

Change in cancerrisklevel
(prior= nationalaverage)
Change in cancerrisklevel
(prior= stateaverage)
Change in no. of words
printedabout sitesin newspaper
Change in whetherRemedial
has been conducted
Investigation

(0.020)

(0.025)
-158.234**
(78.330)
2.297 X 10-6**
(1.080 x 10-6)
-0.009
(0.007)

0.090***

(0.020)

0.076***

(0.025)

-302.915"
(166.022)
2.328 X 10-6**
(1.078 x 10-6)
-0.009
(0.007)

Correctedstandarderrorsare in parentheses.Each observationrepresentsa repeatsale of a house, and the dependent
variableis the log of the price ratioof the scales. N = 1883.
* Significantat the 10% level.
** Significantat the 5% level.
*** Significantat the 1% level.

of Superfundsites.The standarderrorsreportedin theregressiontablesare correctedforthepossible existenceof heteroskedasticity.
Sale pricesrise withinflation,
as expected.The annualprice indexestimatesare positiveand
at
the
level
1%
for
both
significant
equations for each year.25Our goal is to test whetherthe
EPA's RI/FS and the site-specific
risklevels affectresidents'beliefswithregardto the hazardous
waste risksand resultin a pricechange.We also examinewhetherthe local newspaperservesas a
mechanismto disseminateinformation
aboutthe Superfundsites.
The coefficient
estimatesindicatethathousingpricesrespondto EPA information
about risk
in
levels the expecteddirection.Given priorsbased on the nationalaverage,the mean change in
risk levels (which involvesa decrease in risk,since the updatedrisklevel is lower thanthe prior
risk level) resultsin a housingprice increaseof $87. Given priorsbased on the stateaverage,the
mean change in risklevels resultsin a housingprice increaseof approximately
$56. This effectis
different
fromzero at the 5% level forthe firstspecification
and at the 10% level for
significantly
the second specification,
forwhicheach testis a two-tailedtest.26
25 Note thatthe

base year is 1988. Also note thatthe annual dummyvariablescould captureeffectsotherthaninflation,such
as depreciation.
26 As mentionedpreviously,we also estimatedrepeat sales equations using priorsin which the average on-site risks are
weighteduniformly(using average dilutionestimates)across the populationof the houses. The coefficientestimatesfor
these equationsalso show a negativeeffectof risklevels on housingprices,althoughthiseffectis not statistically
significant. This findingcould indicatethatpeople base theirpriorson theirunderstanding
of the distanceof theirhouses to the
closest site,or it could be due to the lack of heterogeneity
of the independentvariableof interest.
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These coefficient
estimatesprovideevidencethathousingpricesare respondingto changesin
risk.It is important
to emphasizethatthisconclusionassumesthattherisklevel is notconfounded
withothereffects.For example,thereleaseof theinformation
aboutrisklevels could also be interpretedby theresidentsas a sign thatthe EPA will soon clean up the site,and thesefuturebenefits
of a cleanupwill thusbe capitalizedintothehousingprice.The RI/FS dummyvariableis included
in an attemptto controlfortheseconfounding
effects.
thenthe
If one assumesthatresidentsfullyupdatetheirbeliefswiththenew riskinformation,
change in risklevels is equivalentto the changein riskbeliefs(i.e., if (p = 0, thenEqn. 8 equals
q - p). Underthisassumption,one can estimatethe value of a statisticalcancercase by multiplyestimatesforthe Risk variableby the housingprice.27 The value mustthenbe
ing the coefficient
adjusted by dividingby the average numberof people per household,since the housing price
reflectsthe willingnessto pay forrisk reductionsforeach householdmember.28Thus, using the
resultsforpriorsbased on the nationalaveragerisks,the value of a statisticalcancercase is estimatedat $4.3 million.Using the resultsforpriorsbased on the stateaveragerisks,the value of a
statisticalcancer case is estimatedat $8.3 million.These estimatesare similarto the estimatesof
the value of a statisticallifefoundin manylabor marketand productmarketstudies.29These estiestimatefoundin our earlierstudy(Gayer,
matesare also similarto the $4 millionpostinformation
evidence
forthe GrandRapids sample,thus
based
on
cross-sectional
Viscusi
and
Hamilton,
2000)
the
two
studies.
suggestingconsistencybetween
We derivethe estimatesof the value of a statisticalcancer case by using the estimatedrisk
estiof the repeatsales analysis.It should be noted thatwe obtainedthe coefficient
coefficients
mates using the objectivecancer risklevels discussed earlieras our independentvariables.These
whichassumesthatresidentsare exposed to the riskfor
risklevels are based on EPA information,
30 years,thatfuturerisksare not discounted,and thatthereis no latencyperiodbeforethe onset
of cancer.One can relax theseassumptions,computinga new estimateof the value of a statistical
cancer case given different
exposureperiods,discountrates,and latencyperiods.That is, for a
givenannualrisk(RiskA),themeasureused in our empiricalanalysisis 30 x RiskA(i.e., 30 years
of the annual risk).If, instead,one assumed an infinitestreamof annual riskwitha discountrate
r and a latencyperiodof n years,thenthetotalriskwould be
RiskA

RiskAA

+
+
(1+ r) (1+ r)+'

...=

RiskA(1

+

r

(9)

Thus, if thisannualstreamis the accurateriskmeasure,thenthe30-yearassumption(withno
discountrateand no latencyperiod)yieldsestimatesthatare offby a factorof (1 + r)' "/30r.30
One mustdivide theestimatesforthevalue of a statisticalcancerby thisamountin orderto obtain
streamof riskswiththegivendiscountrateand laan estimateunderthe assumptionof an infinite
equationis as follows:
tencyperiod.In otherwords,thetransformation

VOC' = VOC X 30r(1+ r)"-',

(10)

27 The value of a
statisticalcase of cancer is computedby dividingthe pointestimateof the marginalwillingnessto pay for

risk reductionby the level of risk reduction.For inframarginal
changes,the hedonic price gradientis an upperbound of
the willingnessto pay forriskreduction.
28 The average numberof people
per householdin the relevantblock groupsis 2.573.
29 See Viscusi (1993) fora reviewof labor market
findingsand forsurveyevidence on cancer valuation.
30 Note, forexample,thata
30-yearstreamof risks withno discountrate and no latencyperiod is equivalentto an infinite
streamof risksat a 3.4% discountratewithno latencyperiod.
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wherer is the discountrate,n is the latencyperiod,and VOC is $4.3 milliongiven priorsbased
on the nationwideaverage and $8.3 million given priorsbased on the statewideaverage. For
example,the estimatedvalue of a statisticalcancer case given a 3% discountrate and a 10-year
$5.1 millionbased on thenationwidepriorsand $9.7 millionbased
latencyperiodis approximately
on the statewidepriors.
Althoughthe resultsare not reportedin the tables,we also estimatedrepeatsales equations
risklevels replacwitheitherthe changein estimatedsoil risklevels or the changein groundwater
ing the change in overall risk levels. Distinguishingthese componentrisks allows us to test
whetherpeople are willingto pay moreor less forsoil riskreductionwithrespectto groundwater
riskreduction.The coefficient
estimatesforthe changein risklevels by mediumwere significantly
fromzero at the 10% level when priorsbased on the nationalaverage risks were asdifferent
different
fromzero when priorsbased on the
sumed, but these estimateswere not significantly
state average were assumed. When priorsbased on the nationalaverage are used, the estimated
price-risktradeoffimpliesstatisticalcancercase values of $4.5 millionforsoil riskand $8.7 milriskreductionmore
risk.This findingsuggeststhatpeople value groundwater
lion forgroundwater
thantheydo soil riskreduction(or thattheyplace greaterinformational
weighton new informariskthantheydo on new information
about soil risk).
tionabout groundwater
The estimatesobtainedindicatethatan increasein the mean numberof wordsprintedin the
Grand Rapids Press about the Superfundsites causes housingvalues to increase.Housing prices
at the 5% level forbothequations.
increaseby 3% in bothequations,and estimatesare significant
The dollar change forthe mean housingprice given thischange in publicityis $2052 forthe first
equation and $2080 for the second equation. This amountsto a price increaseof approximately
to a neighborhoodSuperfundsite. This priceincreasesuggeststhat
$89 foreveryarticlepertaining
residentsperceivelocal newspaperarticlesaboutthe sitesas good news.31In the cross-sectional
resultsreportedin Tables 3 and 4, the effectof publicityon housingpriceswas mixed.The positive
correlation
foundfortherepeatsales equationsimpliesthatsome time-invariant
unobservablecharresults.
acteristicsapparentlyare correlatedwithpublicity,thusbiasingthecross-sectional
The coefficient
estimatesindicatea negativeeffectof thereleaseof an RI/FSfortheclosestsite
on prices.Holdingall else constant,ifan RI/FSis releasedfortheclosestsite,thepriceof a house dedifferent
fromzeroforeitherspecification.
creasesby 1%. However,thiseffectis notsignificantly
studiessometimesindicatethatpeople do not accuratelyassess technicalriskinExperimental
formation(Slovic, Fischhoff,and Lichtenstein1982) and that individualseitheroverreactto or
Contraryto theseclaims,our repeatsales regressionsbased on marignorenew riskinformation.32
ket data indicatethatresidentsrespondto the information
about risk levels providedby the EPA
and to information
providedby the local newspaper.Residentslower theirrisk beliefsforneighborhoodSuperfundsites,resultingin an increasein housingprices.

Estimationof AlternativeSpecifications
For robustness,we estimateequationswitheach of the time-variant
variablesof interest,as
well as pairs of thesevariables,omittedfromtherepeatsales equation.To theextentthatthe local
31 We also
estimateda model thatincludesthe interaction
of riskand news, and we founda nonstatistically
effect
significant

withthismodel. This findingsuggeststhatthe price-newsgradientdoes not varygiven different
values of risk.

32 See, for
example, Slovic (1986). Viscusi, Magat, and Huber (1987) firstidentifiedsuch referencerisk effects.Hartman,

Doane, and Woo (1991) also foundevidence of statusquo bias in consumervaluationof the reliabilityof residentialelectricalservice.
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newspaperreportson the information
providedby the EPA, the News variablemay be correlated
withtheRisk variable,resultingin a biased estimateof the effectof therisklevels whentheNews
variableis excluded.Similarly,therelease of an RI/FS could be correlatedwiththe Risk variable.
The alternative
estimatescaptureboth the directeffectof the includedvariable(s) of interestand
theeffectof theomittedvariable(s).Table 6 containstheregressionresultsof thevariablesof interest whenthe priorsare based on the nationalSuperfundaverage,and Table 7 containsthe regression resultsof thevariablesof interest
whenthepriorsare based on the stateSuperfundaverage.
Althoughthe resultsare not reportedin the tables,the estimatesforthe annual indexes are
at the 1% level foreach equation.The coefficient
estimatesforthe change
positiveand significant
in the risklevel are negativeand significant
forall of the pertinent
The coefficient
specifications.
estimateforthe change in News is significant
at the 5% or the 10% level when a measureof the
change in the risk level is not includedin the regression,and it is significantat the 10% level
whenthechangein therisklevel is includedin theregression.The slightchangein theNews coefficientestimatewhenthechangein riskis removedfromtheequationsuggeststhatthereis a small
correlationbetweennewspapercoverage and risk.Nonetheless,overall,the estimationresultsare
As shownin Table 5, the coefficient
estimateforthe changein RI/FS
stable across specifications.
fromzero for any of the specifications,
statusis not significantly
different
suggestingthatthe
on price.These
exclusionof thisvariabledoes not bias theresultsof the effectof riskinformation
evidence thatpeople lower theirrisk beliefsafterthe EPA releases siteresultsthusofferfurther
resultingin increasedhousingprices.
specificriskinformation,
We also conducteda testof whetherthe repeatsales resultsof thispaper are consistentwith
the full-sampleresultsobtainedin our earlierstudy(Gayer,Hamilton,and Viscusi 2000). In the
previouspaper,we assumedthatthe log of priceswas a functionof (among otherthings)the RI/
of the risk and the RI/FS status.However,
FS status,the objectiverisk level, and an interaction
since we did not explicitlyformulatepriorand updatedrisk levels (as we do in this paper),the
objectiverisklevel was the same whetheror not the RI/FS had been releasedyet. As a check on
of our previouspaper
the repeatsales model,we reestimated
Equation5, adaptingthe specification
and usingthe assumptionof equal priorand updatedrisklevels. As
to the repeatsales framework
in our earlierstudy(Gayer,Hamilton,and Viscusi 2000), theriskmeasurewe use forthisequation
is theaggregateof all of therisksfromthelocal sites.The new equationis as follows:
T

ri,,,=

j= 1

bjxj + olRIit + o2(Riski Riski) + o3[(RIi,,XRiski) (Rli,XRiski)]

+ o4Newstt' + uitt'

3byxy+

T

=

j=1

+ uitt'.
IRIt,, + 13Riski(RI;,,- RIit)+ o4Newst,,t

(5')

in the repeatsales methodeliminatestime-invariant
Since takingdifferences
effects,the risk
variable drops out, and the equation cannotestimatethe price-risktradeoffbeforeand afterthe
release of the RI/FS. Nevertheless,the equation does test whetherthe change in price resulting
fromthe release of the RI/FS varieswithrespectto the level of risk.Table 8 shows the resultsof
thisrobustnesscheck.These resultssuggestthattherelease of theRI/FS does reduceprice(though
not significantly),
and thatthe price reductionis smallerforhigher-risk
houses. When evaluations
are carriedout forthe mean risklevel and the mean housingprice,the resultssuggestthattherelease of the RI/FS decreasesa house's price by $612. In our earlierstudy(Gayer,Hamilton,and

Table 6. Alternative
Specifications(Prior= NationalAverage)
Variable

Change in cancer
risklevel
Change in no. of
wordsprinted
about sitesin
newspaper
Change in whether
Remedial Investigationhas been
conducted

I(b)

I(c)

- 146.998*
(77.864)

I(d)

I(e)

2.005 X 10-6*
(1.096 x 10-6)

-0.004
(0.007)

2.304 X 10-6**
(1.083 x 10-6)
-0.007
(0.007)

Correctedstandarderrorsare in parentheses.Each observationrepresentsa repeatsale of a house, and the dependentvariableis the log of
sentsan alternative
specificationof the repeatsales model. Althoughnot reportedin thistable,theseequationsincludethe othervariableslistedi
* Significant
at the 10% level.
** Significant
at the5% level.

Table 7. Alternative
Specifications(Prior= StateAverage)
Variable

Change in cancer
risklevel
Change in no. of
wordsprinted
about sitesin
newspaper
Change in whether
Remedial Investigationhas been
conducted

II(b)

II(c)

-282.857*
(163.965)

-0.004
(0.007)

II(d)

II(e)

2.005 x 10-6*
(1.081 x 10-6)

2.304 x 10-6**
(1.083 x 10-6)
-0.007
(0.007)

Correctedstandarderrorsare in parentheses.Each observationrepresentsa repeatsale of a house, and the dependentvariable is the log of
sentsan alternative
specificationof the repeatsales model. Althoughnot reportedin thistable,theseequationsincludethe othervariableslistedi
* Significant
at the 10% level.
** Significant
at the5% level.

286

and Viscusi
Gayer,Hamilton,

Table 8. Robustness
CheckofRepeatSales Regression
Results
Variable

Intercept
Year 1989
Year 1990
Year 1991
Year 1992
Year 1993
has been conducted
Change in whetherRemedialInvestigation
has been
Risk X changein whetherRemedialInvestigation
conducted
Change in no. of wordsprintedabout sitesin newspaper

I

0.059***
(0.006)
0.055***
(0.006)
0.087***

(0.009)

0.090***
(0.014)
0.077***
(0.020)
0.076***
(0.025)
-0.009
(0.007)
15.792**
(8.065)
2.345 X 10-6**
(1.078 x 10-6)

Correctedstandarderrorsare in parentheses.Each observationrepresentsa repeatsale of a house, and the dependent
variable is the log of the price ratioof the sales. The risk measureused in the interactionindependentvariable is constant
over time(as in Gayer,Hamilton,and Viscusi 2000). N = 1883.
** Statisticallysignificant
at the 5% level.
*** Statisticallysignificant
at the 1% level.

betweenthese two reViscusi 2000) the price reductionwas estimatedat $670.33 The similarity
sultssuggeststhatthesetwo papersare consistentwitheach other.
We offerone finalcomparisonwithour previouspaper as a consistencytest.For this test,
we estimatedthe cross-sectionalequation of the previouspaper using the full sample of 16,928
in the explicitlyformulated
observationsand substituting
priorand updatedrisklevels used in the
currentpaper.Given priorsbased on the nationalaverage,the estimatedpostinformation
price-risk
gradientwas - 151. Evaluatedat the mean price,thisimpliesa value fora statisticalcase of cancer of $4.3 million.Given priorsbased on the stateaverage,the estimatedpostinformation
pricerisk gradientwas -149. Evaluatedat the mean price,thisimpliesa value fora statisticalcase of
cancer of $4.3 million.These estimatesare very similarto the $4 millionestimateobtainedin
our earlierstudy(Gayer,Hamilton,and Viscusi 2000), again suggestingconsistencybetweenthe
two papers.

6. Conclusion
The emergenceof right-to-know
legislation(such as theEmergencyPlanningand Community
Right-To-KnowAct of 1986, the PollutionPreventionAct of 1990, and the Food and Drug
33The mean risk in the sample used in Gayer,Hamilton,and Viscusi (2000) was almostan orderof magnitudesmallerthan
the mean riskused in the repeatsales sample forthispaper. This may suggestthathigh-riskhouses are morelikelyto sell
repeatedlyduringa given period.
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ModernizationAct of 1997) suggestsan increasedrelianceon the abilityof people
Administration
on healthrisks.These right-to-know
to assess publiclyprovidedinformation
policies have raised
the issue of how much confidencepolicy makersshould place on people's abilityto thinkclearly
about the risks theyface. If individualsaccuratelyprocess the risk information
providedby the
transfers
can fostersounderriskdecisions.Our analysisof thehoussuch information
government,
examinesrisklearningbased on housingmarketbehavEPA
risk
information
of
effects
ing price
or
on
without
ior,
relying experimental surveydata.
about hazardouswaste risklevels,
In orderto testwhetherindividualsrespondto information
risk
we make plausibleassumptionson how people formtheirbeliefsbeforereceivingsite-specific
fromthe EPA, residents
information
We assume thatbeforereceivingthe site-specific
information.
base theirinitialbeliefs about the cancer risk fromthe local Superfundsites on theirgeneral
assume that
knowledgeof therisksposed by nationwide(or statewide)Superfundsites.We further
resultfromchanges in risk beliefsand not fromotherconchanges in price due to information
we findthathousing
for
the
time-invariant
factors.
housingcharacteristics,
founding
Controlling
risk
in GrandRapids are,
level
of
risk.
levels
the
sites
indeed
to
the
Since
for
do
respond
prices
on average,lower thanthe nationwide(or statewide)averagerisklevel, residentslower theirrisk
beliefsand housingpricesincrease.
evaluateprogramsthataddresscancer
Regulatoryagencies such as the EPA mustfrequently
an
must
obtainestimatesof the value of such
risks.In orderto enact efficient
regulations, agency
riskreductions.Typically,labor marketstudiesare the sourceof such estimatesbecause of therelativelygreateravailabilityof labor marketriskmeasures.However,estimatesof thevalue of a statisticallife obtained froma certainpopulationof workersmay not be appropriatefor another
or children.Moreover,mostlabor marketstudies
population,such as one thatincludesnonworkers
riskand mustrelyon surveydata to evaluatewillingnessto pay forcancerrisk
focus on mortality
reductions.
In thispaper,we use housingmarketevidenceto findthatresidentslearnfromthecancerrisk
information
providedby the EPA and thattheirreductionin risk beliefsleads to an increasein
tradeoff
housingprices.The estimatedprice-risk
impliesa value of a statisticalcancercase of $4.3
million to $8.3 million. If one assumes a 3% discountrate with a 10-yearlatencyperiod for
acquiringcancer,the tradeoffimplies a value of a statisticalcancer case of $5.1 millionto $9.7
million.Thus, by developingmeasuresof house-specificcancer risk beliefsbeforeand afterthe
EPA's riskreport,we providehousingmarketestimatesof thevalue of a statisticalcancercase that
are highlyconsistentwith estimatesof mortalitytradeoffsfound in otherdomains (such as the
labor marketor the automobilemarket).Our resultsalso suggestthatresidentsperceivethe newspaper coverageof the Superfundsites as good news and thatthisperceptionresultsin an increase
in individualhousingpricesof approximately
$89 per article.
leads residentsto adjusttheirinitialestimatesof
Our analysissuggeststhatEPA information
the risksfromhazardouswaste sites,resultingin a change in housingprices.These resultscontradict previousstudiesthatsuggestthatpeople have eitheralarmistreactionsor no reactionat all to
riskinformation.34
We provideevidencethatresidentsexhibitthe abilityto learnfrominformation
presentedby the EPA on the specificlocal risksand thatlarge gains fromlearningcan take place
once thepublicreceivesexpertriskinformation.

34 See, forexample,Nisbettand Ross (1980) and Morganet al. (1985).
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